In Pericchi and Pereira (2012) it is argued against the traditional way on which testing is based on fixed significance level, either using p-values (with fixed levels of evidence, like the 5% rule) or α values. We instead, follow an approach put forward by DeGroot (1975) , on which an optimal test is chosen by minimizing type I and type II errors. Morris DeGroot in his authoritative book (1975), Probability and Statistics 2nd Edition, stated that it is more reasonable to minimize a weighted sum of Type I and Type II error than to specify a value of type I error and then minimize Type II error. He showed it beyond reasonable doubt, but only in the very restrictive scenario of simple VS simple hypothesis, and it is not clear how to generalize it. We propose here a very natural generalization for composite hypothesis, by using general weight functions in the parameter space. This was also the position taken by Pereira (1985 Pereira ( , 1993 Pereira ( , 2010 . We show, in a parallel manner to DeGroot's proof and Pereira's discussion, that the optimal test statistics are Bayes Factors, when the weighting functions are priors with mass on the whole parameter space. On the other hand when the weight functions are point masses in specific parameter values of practical significance, then a procedure is designed for which the sum of Type I error and Type II error in the specified points of practical significance is minimized. This can be seen as bridge between Bayesian Statistics and a new version of Hypothesis testing, more in line with statistical consistency and scientific insight.
Minimizing the sum of weighted errors
Morris DeGroot (1975) , argued that instead of fixing Type I error and minimize Type II, a better hypothesis testing paradigm is to choose the test as to minimize a weighted sum of the errors, namely
where δ denotes the test: δ(x) = 1 R (x), where R is the Rejection Region of H 0 , I S (y) is the indicator function, equal to 1 if and only if y ∈ S. Notice the apparently slight difference of (1) with the traditional approach of Significance Testing:
Restricting to those tests δ on which Type I error: α(δ) ≤ α 0 , Min δ β θ 1 (δ).
However, the difference is far reaching as we will see in the sequel. In the following the superiority of DeGroot's approach is distinctly apparent. DeGroot in his book, only presented the approach for Simple VS Simple hypothesis. In the next section we generalize for a general setting.
A General Formal Approach
Suppose we are testing the following two general hypotheses:
We define, in the Neyman-Pearson tradition, Type I and Type II error, of the test δ at the parameter point θ as,
Definition: The weighted Type I and Type II errors are defined respectively as:
and
where π j (θ) ≥ 0 are such that Θ j π j (θ) = 1, j = 0, 1.
How to understand the weight (prior) measures?
We pause here to discuss interpretations, since there are various possible interpretations of the weight measures π j (θ), j = 0, 1.
Prior Measures:
The most obvious is the assumed prior density of the parameter values conditional on each hypothesis, which is the natural interpretation under a Bayesian framework. Notice that not necessarily this interpretation leads to a subjective approach. If a general method for generating conventional priors like the Intrinsic prior method, then this can be considered a non-subjective approach. But there is room for other interpretations.
2. Point Markers of Statistical Importance: These are point masses signalling specific points for which the errors ought to be controlled by design. For example if for a particular value of θ 1 ∈ Θ 1 , where there is "practical significance", for example a novel medical treatment improvement of 20%, say, then the weight function may be set as a point mass on 20% of improvement. (This typically would work for monotone likelihood ratio families).
The Criterion
Define the weighted likelihoods, for the Data = y under each hypothesis as
Lemma 1: It is desired to find a test function δ that minimizes, for specified a > 0, and , b > 0:
The test δ * is defined as: accept H 0 , if
and accept any if a · 0 (y) = b · 1 (y). Then for any other test function δ:
Proof: Denote by R, the rejection region of the test δ, that is those data points on which H 0 is rejected. Then, under the mild assumptions of Fubbini's Theorem that allows interchanging the order of the integrals, for any test function δ,
The results follows from application of the definition of δ * in expressions 9 and 10, since every point on which a· 0 (y)−b· 1 (y) < 0 is in R, but no point on which a· 0 (y)−b· 1 (y) > 0, is included. Therefore δ * , minimizes the last term in the sum and the first does not depend on the test. So the result has been established. Regarding the assessment of the constants a and b, notice that it suffices to specify its ratio a/b = r. This can be made as: i) By finding the implicit a and b of a carefully designed experiment, ii) Conventional table of ratio of evidences, like in Jeffreys Scale-Table of evidences, or iii) by a ratio of prior probabilities of H 0 times the loss incurred by false rejection of H 0 over the prior probability of H 1 times the loss incurred by false acceptance of H 0 , in symbols:
To see this, notice that the risk function can be written as R(θ, δ) = L 1 α θ (δ) if θ ∈ Θ 0 , and
Assuming that a priori the probability of the Null Hypothesis is P (H 0 ), then the average (Bayesian) risk, taking expectations with respect to (P (H 0 ), π 0 ) and ((1 − p(H 0 )), π 1 ), we get the averaged risk
and it is seen that the correspondence with expression (8) is:
The Rejection Region R in (10) takes two different shapes according to the interpretations 1 and 2.
• For interpretation 1, R is defined as
that is the Null Hypothesis is rejected if the Bayes Factor of H 0 over H 1 is small enough.
• For interpretation 2, R becomes,
the relative likelihood ratios on the null over the alternative.
For examples and further discussions, see Pericchi and Pereira (2012) .
2 DeGroot's approach and the Likelihood Principle.
One of the usual criticisms against significance testing is that it does not obey the Likelihood Principle, a Principle not only shared by Bayesians, but that was actually enunciated or defended by eminent non-Bayesians. Loosely speaking the Likelihood Principle establishes that if two likelihoods are proportional to each other, the information about the parameter vector θ is the same. 
and in the ratio of the left hand side, the constant in the likelihood cancel out.
Conclusions
DeGroot's approach, and our implementation here in a general setting highlight the following:
1. A way out of the main disagreement(that of divergent measures of statistical significance of tests) among statisticians is to implement DeGroot's framework: This is no less than a powerful template on which the ideas of risk decision theory, types of error, tail probabilities, relative loss, and likelihood ratios are put together and make them coherent.
2. In order to generalize the framework, we have shown that by considering the averaged Type I and Type II error, the theory and the main result, (the optimality of the ratio of the evidences, i.e. of the Bayes Factor) is completely general.
